





Untuk Indonesia abad 21 pertanyaan penting adalah bagaimana
mengelola pluralisme secara demokratis dan beradab. Suatu
Negara demokratis tentu memerlukan masyarakat yang madani,
namun yang sering dilupakan, terutama dalam Negara-negara
pasca-otoritarian, adalah bahwa masyarakat yang madani
membutuhkan penegakan hukum. Secara teoretis hampir tak
ada konsep yang jelas ihwal masyarakat madani itu, yang
menyulitkan penelitian empiris. Maka artikel ini menggunakan
pandangan dari wilayah ilmu politik dan filsafat politik untuk
mendapatkan gambaran lebih jelas tentang situasi Indonesia
saat ini.
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Pluralism and rational disagreement about the truth are commonfeatures in today's societies. Indonesia is no different from that
perspective. “The question of how to achieve civility and inclusive
citizenship in deeply plural societies is today a near-universal one.” And
1
Robert Hefner is right. In this essay I explore the relationship between
society and the state in post-Soeharto Indonesia. This should be a
relationship of mutual reinforcement: for a society to be civilized it needs a
strong liberal democratic state and for a state to be democratic it needs a
civil society.
The intuition many hold is that pluralism in society is a destabilizing
factor for democracy, so writes the Freedom House president Karatnycky
that “democracy has been significantly more successful in monoethnic
societies than in ethnically divided and multiethnic societies.” Many
2
political scientists and journalists alike agree that consensus and
compromise are difficult to attain for when a society is highly divided. Many
Indonesians fear that the plurality of cleavages ethnic, linguistic, cultural,
religious, political, ideological, economical could cause disintegration or
even a 'balkanization'. Fish and Brooks wrote an article titled 'Does
3
Diversity Hurt Democracy?' to test this intuition. Their conclusion is that
“ethnic homogeneity is associated with more open political regimes […not
and] the degree of diversity is not shown to influence democracy's
prospects.” Crawford Young concurs with this conclusion in a review on
4
African identity politics. Young writes that “cultural pluralism alone is not
the prime determinant [of conflict]; countries that have escaped disorder
are no less diverse than those in which armed conflict has erupted.” While
5
scholars might be honest in their intentions, it is the idea that diverse
6
countries are unfit for democracy which is misused by autocratic rulers all
over the world. Soeharto claimed that the 'little people' ( orwong cilik, rakyat
massa) are not capable of making prudent decisions. During Soeharto's
authoritarian New Order ( ) regime the 'little people' were the soOrde Baru
called 'floating mass' and this mass should be left as much as possible
outside the political realm. This mass was or is seen as an irrational mass of
people who cannot be trusted and who do not realize what is really in their
interest.
While we should not be too fast in concluding that pluralism has a
negative correlation with the prospects of democracy, what about the
relationship between Islam and democracy? The prospects of democracy,
Samuel Huntington says, are bleak in countries with Muslim majorities and
7




theological and anthropological reasons to shed doubt on Huntington's
statement.
The scholar and former rector of Paramadina University Nurcholish
Madjid has shown tirelessly to his fellow Indonesian Muslims that Islamic
values are not static, for Madjid the door to or renewal needs to andijtihâd
can remain open. And for Madjid there are no theological reasons why
9
Islam should be in contradiction with human rights, democracy, rule of law,
civil society, and tolerance. He writes that individual freedom and
individuals with unalienable rights play an important role in Islam, and
individual citizens can only live in freedom if and only if rulers and ruled are
obliged by the same law, i.e. rule of law. And civil society, according to
Madjid, is according to Islam a community where people obey the law and
respect contracts made on mutual agreement. Another example is former
10
president and former head of the largest Muslim organization Nahdatul
Ulama (NU) Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), who holds a
similar intellectual position as Madjid (even though their socio-cultural
backgrounds are very different). Gus Dur has shown over and over again
that Islam is not monolithic and should not be hijacked by its most
conservative parts. A third example is the Liberal Islam Network ('Jaringan
Islam Liberal JIL').
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It remains a question, though, how much influence these views have in
Indonesia. Madjid has often been criticized by fellow Indonesian Muslims
as a Zionist agent who wanted to ruin Islam from within. Paramadina
University used to conduct mixed marriages (in Indonesia couples should
have the same religion), but under pressure this has been stopped. And Gus
Dur was not only for just a short period president, he seems to have lost
influence within NU. Some of the neighbors of JIL are trying to get JIL
12
evicted from their Utan Kayu base in East Jakarta, because JIL is
supposedly untrue to Islam.
In this perspective we can see the 2005 fatwa (religious decree) by the
Indonesian Muslim Scholars Council ('Majelis Ulama Indonesia MUI')
13
declaring pluralism, liberalism and secularism (unlawful). K.H.haram
Ma'ruf Amin is the chairman of the MUI fatwa committee and he is also a
senior NU (scholar). While MUI acknowledges that a plurality ofulama
religions is a fact of life in Indonesia, pluralism is unlawful, because
pluralism denies religious truth by seeing religions on an equal footing,
hence relativism. Liberalism is declared unlawful because religion is not just
based on freedom of thinking, but also on revelation. And third, secularism
is declared unlawful because secularism cuts the world away from religion
by limiting religion to the relationship between an individual and god.
14
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The liberal democratic state, though, does not promote
secularization, or push religions into the private sphere, but gives room to
15
all conceptions of the good life in general and all religions in particular (as
long as the liberal democratic state is recognized as legitimate). The secular
16
state is not allowed to force a conception of the good on society, nor is it
allowed to force its citizens to believe in a certain way. A secular state should
leave religion to society, and not necessarily secluded to the private sphere.
17
Beside religious reasons there are also historical reasons which can
contradict the claim that Islam and democracy is necessarily no good match
in Indonesia. Just as Islam is not monolithic so is the history of Muslims not
monolithic; the ways Muslims have organized their public life has always
been pluralistic, in different ages and different areas different forms of
organization have been implemented and Islamic statism has been the rare
exception. Just as the West the Muslim world is very rich in its roots. Islam
spread through the Indonesian archipelago not by force but “through
commerce, urban growth, and a new cosmopolitan culture.” This
18
commercial growth was a reason for traders to struggle to limit royal
authority, but even during pre-colonial times legal codes were drawn on
varied sources. (Islamic boarding school), as a civil society
19
Pesantren
organization to be found across the country, is a good example of a
religious and educational network independent of the state.
Almost a decade ago Soeharto stepped down, 21 May 1998 presidential
power was transferred to then vice-president B.J. Habibie, who called for
new elections and a referendum in East Timor (now Timor Leste) to
appease the pro-democracy demonstrators. Indonesia started on a long
road of democratization, rule of law formation, and decentralization. A
road which slowly meanders to a yet unknown future. Since 1998 many
changes occurred in Indonesia. In this era known as Indonesiansreformasi
can elect not only their neighborhood chief but also their president (for the
first time in 2004, in the second round Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won
over Megawati Soekarnoputri, who was the president since 23 July 2001
when Gus Dur was ousted from power). Indeed it is impressive to see how,
by example, the constitution is amended, the amended 1945 Constitution
includes almost the complete list of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The Australian indonesiast Tim Lindsey concludes that Indonesia now
embraces liberal democratic principles. He writes: “Yet within five years of
the signing of the Bangkok Declaration [in 1993] Soeharto's Asian values
discourse was gone from Indonesian public life, as suddenly as the 'old man'
744
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himself. And within nine years, Indonesia had reconstructed its Rechtsstaat
on liberal democratic principles.” Lindsey makes a legal normative point.
20
But legal norms can be paper tigers; a law against discrimination, by
example, is one thing but it is another thing that it becomes part of the
public sphere culture. The codification of liberal norms in laws does not
necessarily cause more freedom or equality for all citizens in the polity.
These norms should be embedded in civil society and enforced by a liberal-
democratic state, and state and society should mutually reinforce one and
another.
But society is not per se civilized, “the mere facts of structural
'autonomy' and 'self-organization' that theorists and activists celebrate as
the essence of civil society do not in any sense guarantee that the attitudes
or actions of civil society groupings will be inclusive or democratic.” The
21
political scientist Daniel Lev continues that “most professionals, NGO
activists, and interested students presuppose that politics is fundamentally
dangerous, amoral, corrupting, and well worth avoiding.” Lev claims that
this is the reason that “there is no bridge between political power and
reform activism.” Freedom does not mean that the state should be absent
22
in society. The state has to guarantee every one's freedom. The state should
guarantee everybody's equal right to freedom by refraining its own actions,
but, sometimes, also by limiting the actions of some citizens against other
citizens; thus when some members of society do not want to be civilized by
threatening the freedom of some others, the state has the duty to protect
and prosecute. Even when something unlawful occurs it should be the
state's monopoly to act upon it and guarantee a fair trial, i.e. no one is
allowed to take the law in one's own hands. Democracy does not just mean
elections, but also that citizens behave civilly and tolerate pluralism, so all
citizens are able to enjoy their equal right to freedom.
23
Democracy does not just mean that citizens are a floating mass of
spectators and only have to get out of their comfortable sofa once in a while
to vote for a neighborhood chief or president candidate. Democracy also
means that citizens have to act in a democratic spirit; democracy cannot
survive without people behaving civilly. Citizens should tolerate pluralism
and thus each other's differences pluralism is an empirical given citizens
have to cope with. Pluralism and rational disagreement about the truth are
common features in today's societies, and from this follows the need for
24
the virtue of civil tolerance (i.e. there is no need for tolerance if there are no
differences that need to be tolerated).
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To define civil society in opposition to the state fits two trends. First, in
post-authoritarian states, like the post-communist states in Eastern Europe,
there is a widespread distrust of the state, its institutions and its
representatives. And this fits a second, global trend: general confidence in
governments seems to be declining. Citizens tend to become politically
cynical when they believe that politicians promise more than they can
deliver, that politicians are in politics to serve their own interests, and that
politicians can only get involved in politics if they are part of an old-boys
network and not because they possess the required talents to serve the
public. Where the state and its government are widely considered as
illegitimate it is unlikely that democracy will grow strong roots in society of
a post-authoritarian state. When public means are often used for private in
25
stead of common ends, for personal gain in stead of, by example, relieving
poverty, politicians will be seen as a self-serving and unresponsive class in
stead of representing the citizenry. The illegitimacy that comes with
corruption, collusion, and nepotism (in Indonesia known under the
acronym KKN) can be overcome in a long established democracy with a
strong and independent judiciary (France is an example), but that could be
entirely different in a young democracy.
The legal ontology that the 'ought' of liberal legal institutions is
connected to the 'is' of the empirical reality is at the least naïve. An anti-
discrimination law, by example, can be a good start to eradicate
discrimination in society to set out a norm and a penalty when this norm is
trespassed, but society and culture cannot be engineered just by means of
legal norms and an enforcement apparatus. Institutions are not enough.
What seems to be done with liberal intentions can have illiberal
consequences, which should not come as a surprise when we realize that in
Indonesia no major political party is based on a liberal ideology with an
agenda promoting rule of law formation. While decentralization is often
26
coupled to democratization, it is not always the case that decentralization
leads to more democracy, decentralization can also be done for the reason
27
to hold on to a network one has (this could have been the reason behind the
decision of Habibie to push for decentralization legislation), and
decentralization can therefore lead to the strengthening of anti-democratic
power holders at the local level. In the 'third wave' literature it seems as if
28
transition is an irreversible process from A to B . Hadiz and Robinson
29
claim, though, that Indonesia is no longer in a transition, they write: “The
pervasiveness of money politics and political violence in post-New Order
politics should not be understood as the mere growing pains of a slowly
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maturing liberal democracy. Instead, they are more fundamentally inherent
to the logic of power relations that define an illiberal form of democracy
already consolidated and entrenched.” But perhaps it is still too early to
30
draw up this conclusion.
32
Below in more detail three examples of how Indonesian society is at
times uncivil.
The Front for the Defense of Islam ('Front Pembela Islam FPI') is a
good example of an uncivilized civil society organization. FPI was
established on 17 August 1998, the first Independence Day in the post-
Soeharto era, by Al-Habib Rizieq Shihab. The FPI fights, as they claim, vice
and sin by cracking down cafés, nightclubs and discos in the Ramadan
period. FPI also blocked several Christian houses of worship; FPI justifies
this by claiming that these buildings are used as churches while lacking the
proper permits (houses of worship should be built with the explicit consent
of local administration heads and residents of the surrounding area). FPI
and others see a conspiracy of by the spread of ChristianKristenisasi
institutions. Islam specialist Martin van Bruinessen claims that FPI is
32
“more like a mob for hire than a genuine Islamic movement.” State
33
representatives justify their inaction by claiming that no violence is used.
But obstructing other people from acting is illegitimate. Azyumardi Azra,
rector of Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, said that
this is encouraged by the “almost complete absence of law enforcement
and, worse still, impunity.” And “the law enforcement vacuum has been an
important raison d'etre for certain radical groups to take the law into their
own hands through unlawful activities.” Azra's conclusion: Indonesia is
34
turning into a 'mobocracy'. And worse still: the ones who are attacked are
35
blamed for inciting social disorder.
As I wrote above, decentralization does not necessarily lead towards
more democracy, let alone liberal democracy, and Hadiz claims that
decentralization has been captured by predatory interests of “individuals
and groups who had earlier functioned as the local operators and
apparatchik of the previous New Order.” Decentralization gives these
36
individuals and groups the institutional context to work at the local level,
but these individuals and groups are willing to mobilize their powerbase or
hire support when favored outcomes cannot be reached through
institutionalized means, Hadiz speaks therefore of the militarization of
society. Ryter describes how this works in Medan, the capital of North
37
Sumatra, where, according to him, a 'bad boy democracy' flourishes. In
38
Medan (literally a free man but with the connotation of the outlaw)preman
747
Roy Voragen Civil Society and Democracy:
and groups as (a youth organization) run gambling, drugsPemuda Pancasilla
trafficking and prostitution, but are also for hire for the extra-legal political
handwork. In the post-Soeharto era youth organizations adapted to the new
multi-party system by supporting different parties (but sometimes
(members of) youth organizations switch sides when the opportunity calls
for it) to intimidate by the number.
39
Another example is how the free press is treated in the democratization
and civil society literature. The press is seen as a necessary component of
democracy. While ideally speaking this holds a truth, the reality is often all
too different. In what legal-political context does the press operate? And are
the media civil? According to Reporters Without Borders the press in
Indonesia is “one of the freest in South-East Asia.” But Binsar Gultom, a
40
judge at Ad-Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, speaks of the
criminalization of the press when in stead of the Press Law the Criminal
Code is used, which has as its consequence that journalists can be jailed and
that media outlets can go bankrupt. So reported Human Rights Watch of
41
'old measures' used by the Megawati governement. Media is big business,
42
and the collusion between business, media and politics is not uncommon
(Italian mogul Silvio Berlusconi comes to the fore, an Indonesian example
is business man and cabinet member Aburizal Bakrie whose family has a
majority share in ANTV), and mass media are not necessarily a neutral
43
vehicle. The difference between information and commercials is blurred
44
by the use of advertorials (some of Yudhoyono cabinet members boosted
about their performances in dailies), and sometimes the content is clearly
45
partisan and one-sided (former president Megawati Soekarnoputri used
state television station TVRI to campaign in the 2004 elections). While
46
journalists are in danger of being prosecuted, and even abducted or
executed, on the other hand the 'envelop' culture persists so that objectivity
can get sold to the highest bidder.
What these examples show is that the normative 'civil society'
argument has its shortcomings. Obviously, if we take 'civil society' as a
normative argument we cannot see it as synonymous with society at large,
because as a normative argument it entails inclusive citizenship and
tolerance, which supports liberal democracy. Liberals see civil society as a
47
setting of settings where liberalism functions as an anti-ideology. But
48
liberals should not make the mistake to suggest that pluralism is self-
sufficient and self-sustaining. So locates John Rawls civil society as where
49
“we as citizens discuss how justice as fairness is to be formulated, and




admits it himself though, an ideal civil society.
Major research on civil society organizations is done by Robert
Putnam. Putnam defines a civil society organization as a non-hierarchical
51
organization that cuts across social cleavages. An organization, according to
Putnam, that cuts across cleavages amounts to bridging social capital
between people from different segments of society, which leads to greater
solidarity and tolerance in society as a whole in stead of distrust between
segments of society. In contrast to bridging social capital bonding social
capital amounts from the trust in one's own subgroup. Putnam seems to
leave (a part of) society out of civil society. He cannot imply that we should
rather want a strong state with a weak society if the only possible civil
society organizations are those which generate bonding social capital which
could polarize and politicize society. If civil society is to be constructive to
52
liberal democracy, as the normative argument goes, then civil society
organizations should be able to specify political issues and social interests.
53
Organizations which are organized to generate bonding social capital are
not necessary a danger for democracy. Indonesians who identify with NU
or Muhammadiyah, the second biggest Muslim organization, are active in
diverse other, non-Muslim civil society organizations. Mujani and Liddle
54
claim that radical Islamist movements will not gain wider support because
of the strength of NU and Muhammadiyah, and they conclude: “Their
strength is one of the great causes for hope in Indonesian democracy.”
55
To speak of transition and that institutions can do the job (and that
behavior of citizens follows) is rather misleading. To conclude with Michael
Walzer: “Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a
democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.” The relationship
56
between the state and society should not be one of a zero-sum game. If this
holds a truth it means that every state is at best a project in progress (even
though the word 'progress' might be too misleading as well) and never a
finished product, which is a liberal conclusion: we liberals favor an open
society by keeping the future open even if we think the present is already (or
should be) perfect, because we cannot know what political issues and social
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